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Adding Marks to the Mix of an Already Muddled
Decision Regarding Public Forums and Freedom of
Speech on the Internet
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”1 Generally, “the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”2 But Congress and
the Supreme Court have recognized that, in certain circumstances,
restrictions on free speech are necessary.3 This results in the difficult
question of when and where such restrictions are appropriate. Adding
public libraries and Internet-related free speech to the mix muddles
things further.
In 1996, Congress began offering federal assistance to help public
libraries provide Internet access to library patrons.4 From 1996 to 2002,
Congress appropriated over $200 million to help public libraries connect
to the Internet.5 In doing so, Congress made it easier for library patrons
to access obscene images and child pornography,6 both of which are
abundantly available on the Internet.7 In response to this unintended
consequence, Congress enacted the Children’s Internet Protection Act8
(“CIPA”), which provides:
[A] library may not receive E-rate or LSTA assistance unless it has “a
policy of Internet safety for minors that includes the operation of a

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) (quoting Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).
3. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (“First Amendment principles,
like other principles, are subject to limitations.”).
4. In 1996, Congress established the E-rate program that allowed qualifying public libraries
to receive Internet access at a discount. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B) (2003). In 2002, pursuant to the
Library Services and Technology Act (“LSTA”), Congress agreed to help “pa[y] costs for libraries
to acquire or share computer systems and telecommunications technologies.” 20 U.S.C. §
9141(a)(1)(E) (2003).
5. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003) (plurality opinion).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000) (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C. §
254 and scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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technology protection measure . . . that protects against access” by all
persons to “visual depictions” that constitute “obscen[ity]” or “child
pornography,” and that protects against access by minors to “visual
depictions” that are “harmful to minors.”9

CIPA defines an acceptable “technology protection measure” as “a
specific technology that blocks or filters Internet access to the material”
covered by CIPA.10
A group of public libraries, library associations, library patrons, and
Web site publishers brought suit challenging the facial constitutionality
of CIPA.11 They argued that Internet filters unconstitutionally restricted
free speech and thus Congress violated its spending power by requiring
public libraries to act in an unconstitutional manner as a condition upon
the receipt of federal funds.12
In a plurality decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act; six of the Justices concurred in the outcome,
but no majority agreed on the reasoning.13 Thus, the Court left a
fractured opinion from which lower courts will need to glean some sort
of guidance. To find the precedential value of American Library Ass’n,
courts must rely on Marks v. United States,14 the purported “Rosetta
Stone” of plurality opinions. Marks states that where there is a plurality
opinion, “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . . .”15
Unfortunately, this tool for extrapolating the “true” holding of a
plurality decision is quite difficult, if not impossible, to employ. As noted
by numerous judges and commentators, the Marks test is much easier
stated than applied.16 Thus, before determining which of the American
Library Ass’n concurrences is guiding under Marks, one must evaluate
how Marks should be used.
This Note starts with a brief introduction to the facts and procedural
history of American Library Ass’n, as well as a quick review of the
associated opinions. Part III discusses in detail when, where, and how the

9. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 201 (plurality opinion) (citing 20 U.S.C. §
9134(f)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2003); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)(i), (C)(i) (2003)).
10. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(I) (2003).
11. Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
12. Id.
13. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
14. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
15. Id. at 193 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(emphasis added)).
16. See infra Part III.
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Marks doctrine should be applied. Part IV delves deeper into the
American Library Ass’n opinions, evaluates the opinions under Marks,
and concludes that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the holding of the
Court. Part V provides a short conclusion.
II. UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASS’N: BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In response to the problems created by the availability of obscenity
and pornography on Internet terminals in public libraries, Congress
enacted the Children’s Internet Protection Act.17 Under this Act, a public
library may not receive federal assistance in providing Internet access
unless it implements software filters18 to block obscene images and child
pornography.19 Since obscenity and child pornography are not
constitutionally protected speech, requiring libraries to block such speech
as a condition of receiving federal funding is not facially
unconstitutional.20 However, CIPA is constitutionally questionable
because the required software filters often “over-block”21 constitutionally
protected speech.
B. Procedural History
Based on the over-blocking tendency of Internet filters, a group of
libraries, library associations, library patrons, and Web site publishers
brought a lawsuit claiming that CIPA is unconstitutional.22 The plaintiffs
forwarded two arguments: (1) CIPA is unconstitutional because the
Internet, accessed via public libraries, is a public forum and any
17. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 198-99 (plurality opinion).
18. Internet filters, as used in this Note, refer to tools and software that prevent someone who
accesses the Internet from visiting specific Web sites. While some sites are blocked based on an
enumerated list of specific Web sites that the filter administrator has chosen to exclude, the majority
of excluded sites are blocked when the filtering software deems a certain site inappropriate based on
the filter’s “analysis” of the Web site’s content.
19. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 199 (plurality opinion).
20. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Dole holds that Congress may not induce
the recipients of federal funds to “engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional” as
a condition upon the receipt of the federal funds. Id. at 210. Here, the plaintiffs challenged CIPA’s
constitutionality arguing that the Act violated Congress’s spending power under Dole because it
required libraries to act unconstitutionally (by enacting Internet filters) as a condition upon the
receipt of federal E-rate and LSTA funds.
21. Over-blocking refers to the tendency of Internet filters to block constitutionally protected
speech in addition to obscenity and child pornography. As noted by the district court, “[F]iltering
programs erroneously block a huge amount of speech that is protected by the First Amendment.”
Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
22. Id. at 407.
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restrictions on speech must overcome strict scrutiny review; and (2) that
Congress exceeded its authority under the Spending Clause by imposing
an unconstitutional condition upon the receipt of federal funds.23 In its
defense, the government argued that a public library’s decision to
exclude certain books and publications from its collection has always
been reviewed under rational basis rather than strict scrutiny review and
that a library’s decision to block certain Internet material and Web sites
should be subject to the same standard.24
After undertaking a lengthy discussion of the public forum
doctrine,25 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania concluded that Internet access in public libraries amounted
to both a designated public forum26 and a traditional public forum.27 The
court then held that Internet filters were content-based restrictions on
access to a public forum and were therefore subject to strict scrutiny
analysis.28 Based on this heightened standard of review, the court held
CIPA facially unconstitutional because the Act was not narrowly tailored
to further the state’s compelling interest in preventing the dissemination
of obscenity and child pornography.29 In other words, the district court
found that other less restrictive means of preventing minors from
accessing obscenity and pornography at public libraries were available,
and thus, the Internet filters did not survive strict scrutiny review.30
C. The Opinions: Briefly31
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the plurality32 and held that CIPA
was facially constitutional because the filtering requirements met the
standards established by rational basis review—the restrictions were
rationally related to the problem of people accessing obscenity and child

23. See id.
24. See id. at 407, 409.
25. See generally id. at 454.
26. Id. at 457.
27. Id. at 466.
28. “Software filters, by definition, block access to speech on the basis of its content, and
content-based restrictions on speech are generally subject to strict scrutiny.” Id. at 454.
29. The District Court agreed that the government had a compelling state interest in
preventing the dissemination of obscene material and child pornography. Id. at 471. But a
compelling interest, on its own, will not overcome the exacting standards of strict scrutiny. Any
restrictions proffered to further the government’s interest must be narrowly tailored or the least
restrictive means of achieving that interest. Id. at 477.
30. Id.
31. For a more detailed look at these opinions, see infra Part IV.A-D.
32. The plurality included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Thomas.
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pornography via public library Internet access.33 The Chief Justice
dismissed the public forum principles relied upon by the lower court as
inapplicable and instead relied upon rational basis review which, he
argued, is the standard of review that the Court has traditionally applied
when evaluating public libraries’ collection-based decisions.34
Justice Breyer concurred in the decision but felt that intermediate
scrutiny, as opposed to rational basis, was the appropriate standard of
review.35 Like the plurality, Justice Breyer dismissed public forum
principles as inapplicable. He concluded on intermediate scrutiny based
on Supreme Court jurisprudence applying intermediate scrutiny where
First Amendment and freedom of speech issues intersect.36
Justice Kennedy also concurred in the judgment but reached his
conclusion in a much shorter fashion. Rather than address the standard of
review issue, Justice Kennedy noted that if libraries, upon the request of
patrons, removed or deactivated the Internet filters in a timely manner,
then no First Amendment rights would be violated.37 Therefore, CIPA
does not require libraries to act unconstitutionally because the
unconstitutional act would be failing to remove or deactivate the filters,
not merely implementing them.38
Although dissenting, Justice Stevens agreed that it is “neither
inappropriate nor unconstitutional for a local library to experiment with
filtering software as a means of curtailing children’s access to Internet
Web sites.”39 However, he held CIPA to be facially unconstitutional
because it “operates as a blunt nationwide restraint on adult access to an
enormous amount of valuable information.”40 As will be discussed in
Part IV.F, Justice Stevens’ reasoning is somewhat suspect and his
conclusions seem to support the argument forwarded by Justice
Kennedy.
In a dissent that paralleled the reasoning of the lower court, Justice
Souter41 argued that filtering Internet access at public libraries violated
library patrons’ First Amendment rights and was thus unconstitutional.42
Consequently, CIPA was unconstitutional because it required libraries to
33. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (plurality opinion).
34. See id. at 205.
35. Id. at 217 (Breyer, J., concurring).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
41. Justice Souter’s dissent was joined by Justice Ginsburg.
42. “I would hold in accordance with conventional strict scrutiny that a library’s practice of
blocking would violate an adult patron’s First and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of Internet
censorship . . . .” Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 242 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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perform unconstitutional acts in order to remain eligible for federal
funding—a clear violation of Congress’s spending power.43
With no clear majority, lower courts must determine which of the
opinions is guiding for precedential purposes.
III. MARKS: WHEN AND WHERE IT WORKS
In Marks v. United States,44 the Supreme Court explained how to
determine the precedential value of a plurality decision. “When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’”45 The Court has not
elaborated on what “narrowest grounds” means, but it is generally
accepted that the phrase refers to “the ground that is most nearly
confined to the precise fact situation before the Court”46 or “‘the
rationale offered in support of the result that would affect or control the
fewest cases in the future.’”47
This theoretical framework for discovering the “true” holding of a
plurality decision seems straightforward enough: look at all the opinions
that concur in the judgment and decide which is the narrowest or least
restrictive. Unfortunately, as both courts and commentators have noted,
this purported Rosetta Stone of plurality opinions is “more easily stated
than applied . . . .”48
Most of the confusion surrounding the Marks analysis arises from a
single question: whether the concurring opinions must share some
fundamental basis or similar reasoning before being proffered as the
Court’s true holding. The answer to this question is critical; if underlying
similarities are not required, Marks seems to allow a single Justice to
change the holding of a case by concurring instead of dissenting. Justice
Powell’s opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke49 is
illustrative. Because Justice Powell seemed to concur on the narrowest
grounds, several lower courts identified his opinion as the true holding of
the case. However, other courts and numerous commentators have

43. “[T]he Act’s blocking requirement in its current breadth calls for unconstitutional action
by a library recipient, and is itself unconstitutional.” Id. at 243.
44. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
45. Id. at 193 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
46. United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1981).
47. Id. (quoting Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality
Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 764 (1980)).
48. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994).
49. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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questioned the precedential value of Justice Powell’s concurrence
because the other eight Justices explicitly rejected the rule proffered by
Justice Powell.50 It seems illogical to extract precedent from a concurring
opinion that no other Justice agrees with.
In addition to allowing a single Justice to “speak for the Court”
where the other eight Justices do not support the reasoning, applying
Marks to the narrowest concurrence without looking for underlying
congruence creates the potential for judicial politicking. The following
hypothetical illustrates: assume there is a split Court with four Justices
supporting the plurality, one Justice concurring, and four Justices
dissenting. What is to stop a would-be dissenting Justice, who obviously
does not agree with the decision reached by the plurality, from
concurring on extremely narrow grounds rather than dissenting? By
concurring, the Justice may have to stomach an unfavorable ruling in the
case at bar, but he or she can significantly affect how courts treat similar
cases in the future.
In this hypothetical, the originally dissenting but now concurring
Justice’s opinion is the most narrow and thus, under Marks, the
precedential opinion of the case. A Justice could conceivably use the
Marks doctrine as a weapon to impose judicial precedent contrary to
majority reasoning. Presumably, a Supreme Court Justice would not
attempt to manipulate the system in such a way. However, the possibility
of such manipulation still exists.
Problems such as the potential for manipulative abuse of the Marks
doctrine and the ability of a single Justice to rule for the entire Court
where no other Justice supports the reasoning can be solved by requiring
that underlying similarities and commonalities be established before
applying Marks. Many lower courts51 and commentators52 support this
approach.
The Supreme Court, however, has failed to clarify the issues
surrounding the Marks analysis. In fact, the Court recently had the
opportunity to illuminate the incongruities in the application of Marks
but failed to do so. In Grutter v. Bollinger,53 the Court was asked to
50. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme
Court, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1185 (1996) (“The other eight participating justices explicitly rejected
[Justice Powell’s] rule. Ironically, the case stands for a proposition that only one justice thought
sensible.”).
51. E.g., King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“In essence, the narrowest
opinion must represent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning; it must embody a position
implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment.”).
52. E.g., Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity
Justification, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 29 (1998) (“The Marks approach may not be particularly
useful in a case where the plurality opinions are arguably inconsistent with each other.”).
53. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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decide whether Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion was valid precedent or
whether the Marks analysis was inapplicable to Bakke due to the lack of
underlying agreements or similarities in the reasoning of the concurring
Justices. The Court dodged the question stating, “[w]e do not find it
necessary to decide whether Justice Powell’s opinion is binding under
Marks. It does not seem ‘useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost
logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower
courts that have considered it.’”54 Thus, rather than spell out how Marks
is correctly applied, the Court decided that the “degree of confusion
following a splintered decision . . . is itself a reason for reexamining that
decision.”55
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s position in Grutter does nothing
to clarify the confusion surrounding the Marks doctrine. In essence, the
Court said that if enough lower courts reached differing results under the
Marks analysis, then the Supreme Court might simply throw the Marks
application out the window and reconsider the entire issue.56 Although
lower courts must still apply Marks, the question of whether or not
Marks applies when the concurring opinions do not share any common
reasoning remains unclear.
Ultimately, the “correct” application of Marks remains unclear.
While one can argue that Marks should simply apply to the narrowest
concurrence, the inherent problems and difficulties of this approach, as
previously discussed, lend support to the theory requiring a threshold
inquiry into underlying similarities and commonalities before using
Marks to glean guiding principles from a fractured decision. This Note
proceeds on the basis that Marks is appropriately applied by looking to
the underlying reasoning of the concurrences rather than to the narrowest
concurrence itself.
IV. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASS’N UNDER MARKS
Because American Library Ass’n is a plurality decision, lower courts
should apply the Marks doctrine in order to find the “true” holding of the
Court.57 Rather than following the opinion concurring on the narrowest
grounds, lower courts should dissect the various opinions looking for
similarities and reasoning supported by a majority of Justices.58 With
Marks application in mind, this Note now turns to the American Library

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 325 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994)).
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 746.
See id.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
See supra Part III.
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Ass’n opinions in search of common underlying reasoning so that the
precedential value of the case can be established.
A. Dissents
Despite basic confusion surrounding the appropriate application of
the Marks doctrine to American Library Ass’n, one thing is clear: the
dissents’ conclusion on strict scrutiny as the standard of review is not the
holding of the Court. Even if one wants to argue that Marks does not
require similar underlying commonalities and reasoning, the rule itself
clearly states that only concurring opinions will be evaluated in the
analysis.59 As declared by the Supreme Court, “the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .”60 Thus, by definition,
the Marks analysis will not evaluate the reasoning or grounds underlying
a dissenting opinion.61 While it may be unclear which of the concurring
opinions is the “holding” for stare decisis purposes, it is clear that the
dissents do not qualify.
B. The Plurality
In a plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed the district
court and upheld CIPA as facially constitutional.62 The Chief Justice first
attacked the district court’s application of the public forum doctrine to
Internet access at libraries.63 He then argued that without the public
forum classification, content-based restrictions on Internet access at
public libraries do not necessarily require strict scrutiny review.64
In assailing the district court’s application of the public forum
doctrine, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that Internet access in public
libraries is neither a traditional public forum nor a designated public
forum. In support of his first proposition, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed
out that the Internet does not meet the definition of a traditional public
forum.65 Specifically, he reasoned that since the Court has traditionally

59. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (1977).
60. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality
opinion)).
61. Id.
62. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion).
63. “[T]he public forum principles on which the District Court relied are out of place in the
context of this case. Internet access in public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor a ‘designated’
public forum.” Id. at 195.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 205-06.
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refused to extend the public forum designation beyond those arenas that
have “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and . . .
[have] been used for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions,”66 the Internet, as a
new and constantly changing resource, should not be given traditional
public forum status.67
In support of his denial of designated public forum status to the
library Internet terminals, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.,68 which states, “The
government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a non-traditional
forum for public discourse.”69 Since libraries obtain Internet terminals
not to create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves or
to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers, but to “facilitate
research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of
requisite and appropriate quality,”70 Internet terminals in public libraries
cannot be considered designated public forums; the library is not
“intentionally opening a non-traditional forum for public discourse.”71
Without a public forum designation, content-based restrictions on
Internet terminals at public libraries do not require strict scrutiny
review.72 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that rational basis review is a
better approach because libraries’ collection-based decisions for print
and other materials have always been reviewed using a rational basis
standard.73
Under rational basis review, the Internet filters are constitutional
because they are rationally related to the problem Congress was
attempting to solve in enacting CIPA.74 Since the filters are
66. Id. (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)).
See also Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (“The Court has
rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic confines.”).
67. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 207 n.3 (plurality opinion).
68. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
69. Id. at 802.
70. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206 (plurality opinion).
71. Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
72. See generally id. at 205-07.
73. See id. at 202-04. There is universal agreement that “generally the First Amendment
subjects libraries’ content-based decisions about which print materials to acquire for their collections
to only rational [basis] review.” Id. at 202 (internal citations omitted). Here, the District Court held
that the Internet terminals were different from traditional print collections and thus subject to a
different standard of review. As previously noted, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with this stance
and held that rational basis was the correct standard of review for both the print collection and
Internet terminals.
74. Id. at 214. Congress sought to prevent minors from accessing obscenity and pornography
at public library Internet terminals. The Internet filters are rationally related to this goal and thus are
constitutional under rational basis review.
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constitutional, Congress had every right to restrict federal funds from
those libraries that did not implement the filters.75
C. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence
Like the plurality, Justice Breyer concluded that CIPA was facially
constitutional. His reasoning, however, was starkly different. He
dismissed rational basis review calling it an inadequate means of
resolution because of the significant First Amendment issues arising
from restrictions on constitutionally protected speech.76 “[W]e should not
examine the statute’s constitutionality as if it raised no special First
Amendment concern—as if, like tax or economic regulation, the First
Amendment demanded only a ‘rational basis’ for imposing a
restriction.”77
Justice Breyer then attacked the strict scrutiny approach supported by
the district court78 and the dissents.79 He pointed out that libraries often
engage in the selection of materials for their collections and that “[t]o
apply ‘strict scrutiny’ to the ‘selection’ of a library’s collection . . . would
unreasonably interfere with the discretion necessary to create, maintain,
or select a library’s ‘collection.’”80 In other words, “‘strict scrutiny’
implies too limiting and rigid a test . . . to believe that the First
Amendment requires it in this context.”81
Falling between the plurality and the dissenters, Justice Breyer
concluded on heightened (intermediate) scrutiny—a standard the Court
has applied in other contexts where speech-related restrictions were at
issue.82 Under heightened scrutiny, Justice Breyer concluded that the
compelling nature of protecting minors from obscenity and pornography
outweighed the “comparatively small burden that the Act imposes upon
the library patron seeking legitimate Internet materials.”83 Since “no one
has presented any clearly superior or better fitting alternatives”84 to

75. Id.
76. See id. at 216 (Breyer, J., concurring).
77. Id.
78. See Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 454 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
79. See infra Part IV.F.
80. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 217 (Breyer, J., concurring).
81. Id.
82. Id. Justice Breyer cites several examples where the Court used heightened scrutiny to
evaluate speech-related restrictions. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Denver Area
Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740-47 (1996) (plurality opinion);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring); Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
83. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 220 (Breyer, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 219.
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Internet filters, the restrictions survive the heightened scrutiny test and
are constitutional. Following this line of reasoning, Justice Breyer
concluded that CIPA is facially constitutional because it does not require
libraries to act in an unconstitutional manner as a condition upon the
receipt of federal funds.85
D. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
Justice Kennedy took only four paragraphs to conclude that CIPA
was facially constitutional.86 His position is succinctly described at the
end of his concurrence:
The interest in protecting young library users from material
inappropriate for minors is legitimate, and even compelling, as all
Members of the Court appear to agree. Given this interest, and the
failure to show that the ability of adult library users to have access to
the material is burdened in any significant degree, the statute is not
unconstitutional on its face.87

Justice Kennedy never reached the applicability of the public forum
doctrines and the associated standard of review question.88 He noted that
there is little to this case if, at the request of a patron, a librarian will
unblock filtered material or disable the filter without significant delay.89
If the library removes the filter, the patron’s First Amendment rights
have not been violated. Since CIPA allows libraries to remove the filters
upon patron request and thus prevent violation of patrons’ constitutional
rights, the requirement of the filters is not adequate grounds for a facial
challenge.90
Justice Kennedy’s approach falls in line with Supreme Court
jurisprudence on facial challenges to acts of Congress: “A facial
challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”91 Moreover,
as noted in Bowen v. Kendrick,92 the Supreme Court will not declare a
legislative act facially unconstitutional simply because there is the
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. at 220.
See id. at 215 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Compare id. at 214-15, with id. at 203-09 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 215.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (emphasis added).
487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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anticipation that particular applications of the act may result in the
unconstitutional use of funds.93
Thus, Justice Kennedy held that CIPA is facially constitutional
because, as of yet, no library patron’s First Amendment rights have been
infringed upon.94 Additionally, the Court will not hold the Act
unconstitutional merely because someone anticipates that the libraries
might act unconstitutionally in following the Act.95 If, however, a library
did not have the capacity to remove the filters or unblock protected
speech or if the library “burdened” an adult user’s First Amendment right
to view constitutionally protected Internet material, an “as-applied”
challenge to CIPA’s constitutionality would be appropriate.96
E. The Underlying Reasoning
Breaking down the various opinions into specific logical steps
clarifies the similarities and the differences in the Justices’ underlying
reasoning.
The plurality held CIPA to be facially constitutional because
Congress did not violate its spending power by enacting it.97 The
spending power was not exceeded because CIPA did not require libraries
to act in an unconstitutional manner as a condition upon the receipt of
federal funds.98 The filters were constitutional because they met the
rational basis burden; they were reasonably related to the compelling
state interest of preventing the dissemination of obscenity and child
pornography and protected children from accessing harmful material on
the Internet.99 The rational basis test was appropriate because courts have
always reviewed libraries’ content-based collection decisions using a
rational basis standard. Moreover, Internet access at public libraries did
not constitute a public forum and thus the strict scrutiny requirement of
content-based restrictions in public forums was not invoked.100

93. “It has not been the Court’s practice, in considering facial challenges to statutes of this
kind, to strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitutional
use of funds.” Id. at 612 (quoting Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 761 (1976)).
94. See generally Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 214-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 211-12 (plurality opinion).
98. Id.
99. See generally id. at 200-01 (arguing that preventing the dissemination of obscenity and
child pornography and protecting children from harmful aspects of the Internet are legitimate
concerns of the government).
100. “Internet access in public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor a ‘designated’ public
forum.” Id. at 205.
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Justice Breyer held CIPA to be facially constitutional101 because
Congress did not violate its spending power by enacting it.102 The
spending power was not exceeded because CIPA did not require libraries
to act in an unconstitutional manner as a condition upon the receipt of
federal funds. The filters were constitutional because they passed the
intermediate scrutiny test; the filters could be removed relatively easily
and they served the compelling interests of preventing the dissemination
of obscenity and child pornography and of protecting children from
accessing harmful material on the Internet.103 Intermediate scrutiny was
the appropriate standard for judging the restrictions because of the
competing constitutional interests involved;104 previous cases involving
First Amendment rights and compelling state interests were judged on
intermediate scrutiny standards.105 Justice Breyer agreed with the
plurality’s conclusion that strict scrutiny should not apply because
Internet terminals were not public forums.106
Justice Kennedy held CIPA to be facially constitutional107 because
Congress did not violate its spending power by enacting it.108 The
spending power was not exceeded because CIPA did not require libraries
to act in an unconstitutional manner as a condition upon the receipt of
federal funds. The filters were constitutional because they could be
removed relatively easily and they served the compelling interests of
preventing the dissemination of obscenity and child pornography and of
protecting children from accessing harmful material on the Internet.109
Justice Kennedy never reached the public forum and associated standard
of review question.110

101. “I therefore agree with the plurality that the statute does not violate the First
Amendment . . . .” Id. at 220 (Breyer, J., concurring).
102. Admittedly, Justice Breyer never brought up the issue of Congress’s spending power.
However, the original challenge to CIPA was that it induced libraries to violate their patrons’ first
amendment rights and was thus unconstitutional because, under its spending power, Congress cannot
condition the receipt of money on unconstitutional action. By upholding the constitutionality of
CIPA, Justice Breyer implicitly held that Congress didn’t violate its spending clause power.
103. See generally Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 218-20 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 217.
105. Id.
106. “[T]he plurality first finds the public forum doctrine inapplicable . . . . I agree with [the]
determination.” Id. at 215.
107. “[T]he statute is not unconstitutional on its face.” Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108. Like Justice Breyer, Justice Kennedy never explicitly addresses the spending power
issue. However, as previously discussed, holding CIPA to be constitutional necessarily requires a
similar holding that Congress did not violate its spending power. See supra note 102.
109. “Given this [compelling] interest, and the failure to show that the ability of adult library
users to have access to the material is burdened in any significant degree, the statute is not
unconstitutional on its face.” Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 215 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. Since CIPA allowed for the filters to be removed, the Act, arguably, did not put any
restriction upon library patrons’ First Amendment right to receive constitutionally protected speech.
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F. The Narrowest Grounds
The plurality and the concurring opinions all held CIPA to be
facially constitutional because Congress did not exceed its spending
power by requiring libraries to use software filters as a condition of
receiving federal funds.111 All three opinions reached this conclusion
based on the fact that CIPA did not violate the spending clause because
libraries were acting constitutionally when they implemented the
filters.112 From here the opinions diverge. Chief Justice Rehnquist
applied rational basis review and found the filters to be constitutional.
Justice Breyer found the filters constitutional based on a strict scrutiny
standard. In holding that a facial challenge was inappropriate, Justice
Kennedy never reached the standard of review question.
Of the three opinions, Justice Kennedy’s is the narrowest and least
restrictive because it is more confined to the facts before the court.
Justice Kennedy recognized that the standard of review and public
forums need not be addressed because the facial challenge to CIPA was
inadequate.113 Moreover, by leaving significant constitutional
questions—standard of review and public forum issues—open for
discussion, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence would affect or control fewer
cases in the future.114 Because it leaves these issues open for discussion,
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is the least restrictive of First
Amendment rights.
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist’s and Justice Breyer’s reasoning
support the conclusion reached by Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy’s
reasoning, however, does not get you to either the plurality’s or Justice
Breyer’s conclusion. A majority of the Court agreed with Justice
Kennedy’s reasoning; the reverse is not true.
Under Marks, then, Justice Kennedy’s opinion establishes guiding
precedent because it “concurred . . . on the narrowest grounds.”115 It is
the only opinion, which, in its entirety, relies upon reasoning supported
by a majority of the other Justices.116
A related side-note is that Justice Stevens, although dissenting,
In any event, the facial challenge to the act did not allege any specific instances of First Amendment
rights violations and thus, the standard of review question could not be reached on the facts before
the Court.
111. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 214-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
112. See id. at 220-21.
113. Cf. United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1981).
114. See id. (quoting Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality
Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 764 (1980)).
115. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
116. As previously discussed, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s and Justice Breyer’s reasoning and
logical steps are similar to Justice Kennedy’s.

314

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 19

seems to support Justice Kennedy’s position:
I agree with the plurality that it is neither inappropriate nor
unconstitutional for a local library to experiment with filtering software
as a means of curtailing children’s access to Internet Web sites
displaying sexually explicit images. I also agree with the plurality that
the 7% of public libraries that decided to use such software on all of
their Internet terminals in 2000 did not act unlawfully.117

Since Congress has the power to place conditions on the receipt of
federal funds, Congress only violates its spending power when the
conditions require the beneficiary to act unconstitutionally. Here, Justice
Stevens admits that public libraries do not violate the Constitution by
utilizing Internet filters. Therefore, Congress did not violate its spending
power by requiring public libraries to use filters. If an act itself is
constitutional, then Congress can require a beneficiary to perform that
act as a condition on the receipt of federal money. Under United States v.
Salerno, which explicitly states that a facial challenge is only appropriate
where “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid,”118 Justice Steven’s acknowledgment that there are circumstances
under which Internet filters are constitutional implicitly supports Justice
Kennedy’s conclusion that a facial challenge to CIPA is inappropriate.119
V. CONCLUSION
All nine Justices agreed that the “interests” Congress sought to
protect by enacting CIPA are both important and compelling.120 As
Justice Souter noted in his dissent, “[l]ike the other Members of the
Court, I have no doubt about the legitimacy of governmental efforts to
put a barrier between child patrons of public libraries and the raw
offerings on the Internet . . . .”121 But the Court could not agree on the
best way to protect minors without infringing upon the First Amendment
rights of adult library patrons.
117. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (emphasis added).
119. Justice Souter’s dissent indicates that he was aware of the potential for Justice Stevens’
dissent to be read as support for Justice Kennedy. After agreeing with Justice Stevens that the
blocking requirements of CIPA “impose an unconstitutional condition on the Government’s
subsidies to local libraries for providing access to the Internet,” Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 231
(Souter, J., dissenting), Justice Souter goes on to state that “[CIPA] mandates action by recipient
libraries that would violate the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech if the libraries took that
action entirely on their own. I respectfully dissent on this further ground.” Id. (emphasis added).
120. See supra Part IV.A-D.
121. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 231-32 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The dissents argued that strict scrutiny applies and that Internet
filters are unconstitutional under this standard because there are other
less restrictive means of accomplishing the same goal.122
Justice Breyer would apply intermediate scrutiny because freedom of
speech is involved.123 Under this standard, Justice Breyer upheld the
constitutionality of CIPA because of the compelling nature of protecting
children and the relative ease with which the filters could be removed
upon the request of an adult library patron.124
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the plurality applied rational basis
review and concluded that CIPA is constitutional because its restrictions
are rationally related to the goal of protecting minors from obscenity and
pornography.125
Justice Kennedy took a much simpler route; before even getting to
the standard of review question, he noted that no First Amendment rights
would be violated if the filters were removed upon request—CIPA
allowed for removal. Since CIPA does not force libraries to act
unconstitutionally in all situations, a facial challenge to the Act’s
constitutionality was inappropriate.126
While the Court answered the specific questions surrounding CIPA,
the fractured decision, on its face, provides no guidance for evaluating
similar situations in the future. Relying on Marks, a lower court can find
precedent in a plurality decision by looking for the concurrence on the
narrowest grounds. Despite confusion surrounding the application of
Marks, the seemingly best approach is to require some form of
underlying reasoning or commonalities between a majority of the
concurring Justices before finding a specific opinion to be guiding.
Under this approach, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in American
Library Ass’n should be viewed as the precedential opinion because
Justice Kennedy concurs on the narrowest grounds supported by a
majority of the concurring Justices.
Simply put, American Library Ass’n should be read as upholding the
constitutionality of CIPA because a facial challenge was inappropriate.
Since Justice Kennedy never reached the public forum issue, the question
of whether Internet terminals in public libraries constitute public forums
may be unresolved. 127 Clearly though, Justice Kennedy’s opinion leaves
122. See supra Part IV.A.
123. See supra Part IV.C.
124. See supra Part IV.C.
125. See supra Part IV.B.
126. See supra Part IV.D.
127. The four Justices in the plurality and Justice Breyer concluded that public forum
principles do not apply to public-access Internet terminals in libraries. But the precedential value of
this conclusion is questionable because Justice Kennedy’s concurrence does not address the issue
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the door open for future “as-applied” challenges to CIPA’s
constitutionality, an implication that libraries, patrons, and lower courts
should keep in mind.
Tyson Snow

and Marks does not speak to the resolution of collateral issues such as this. One might argue that a
strict adoption of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence causes the public-forum conclusions of the
plurality and Justice Breyer to become mere dicta—under Justice Kennedy’s approach the public
forum question need not be addressed and therefore the conclusions regarding the issue are nonbinding. On the other hand, a majority of the concurring Justices held that public library Internet
terminals are not public forums; this conclusion represents the narrowest grounds on which a
majority of the concurring Justices resolved that specific issue. Whether Marks establishes the public
forum conclusion as guiding precedent remains unclear.

